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Abstract—We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem
concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue.
In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as
to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay.
We first show that the original game has an inefficient Nash
Equilibrium (NE), with a Price of Anarchy (PoA) that scales
linearly or worse in the number of users. In order to improve
the outcome efficiency, we propose an easily implementable
mechanism design whereby the server randomly drops packets
with a probability that is a function of the total arrival rate. We
show that this results in a modified M/M/1 queueing game that is
an ordinal potential game with at least one NE. In particular, for a
linear packet dropping function, which is similar to the Random
Early Detection (RED) algorithm used in Internet Congestion
Control, we prove that there is a unique NE. We also show
that the simple best response dynamic converges to this unique
equilibrium. Finally, for this scheme, we prove that the social
welfare (expressed either as the summation of utilities of all
players, or as the summation of the logarithm of utilities of all
players) at the equilibrium point can be arbitrarily close to the
social welfare at the global optimal point, i.e. the PoA can be
made arbitrarily close to 1. We also study the impact of arrival
rate estimation error on the PoA through simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty years, the usage of the Internet has
transitioned from being primarily academic/research-oriented
to one that is primarily commercial in nature. In the current
Internet environment, each commercial entity is inherently
interested only in its own profit. Developing network mecha-
nisms that are designed to handle selfish behavior has therefore
gained increasing attention in recent years. The game theoretic
approach, which was originally designed to model and guide
decisions in economic markets, provides a valuable set of tools
for dealing with selfish behavior [2]–[7].
In this work, we consider the network congestion problem at
a single intermediate store-and-forwarding spot in the network.
Several users send their packets to a single server with Poisson
arrival rate. The server processes the packets on a first come
first serve (FCFS) basis with an exponentially distributed
service time. This is an M/M/1 queueing model [8]. There
exists a trade-off in this M/M/1 queueing model between
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throughput (representing the benefit from service), and delay
(representing the waiting cost in the queue). In the gateway
congestion control context [9], a measure that is widely used
to describe this trade-off is called “Power”, which is defined
as the weighted ratio of the throughput to the delay. When the
users are selfish, we can formulate a basic M/M/1 queueing
game. In this game, we assume that the users are selfish, and
each control their own input arrival rate to the server. Each
user’s utility is modeled to be the power ratio for that user’s
packets.
This classic M/M/1 queueing game has been formulated and
studied in [10]–[14]. The results from these prior works and
our own results in this work are in agreement that the basic
M/M/1 queuing game has an inefficient Nash Equilibrium. We
are therefore motivated to design an incentive mechanism to
force the users to operate at an equilibrium that is globally
efficient. In particular, we focus on the design of a packet
dropping scheme implemented at the server for this purpose.
Our objective is that the dropping scheme should be as simple
as possible, and it should minimize the Price of Anarchy (PoA,
the ratio of the social optimum welfare to the welfare of the
worst Nash equilibrium) to be as close to 1 as possible.
A key contribution of this work is the formulation of a
modified M/M/1 queuing game with a randomized packet
dropping policy at the server. We consider a simple and low
overhead policy in our formulation, wherein the server need
only monitor the sum of the rates of all users in the system. We
show that this modified game with a packet dropping scheme
is an ordinal potential game [15], which implies the existence
of at least one pure Nash Equilibrium.
We show first that utilizing a step-function for packet
dropping whereby the server drops all the packets when the
sum-rate is greater than a threshold (and none when the sum-
rate is below the threshold), results in infinite number of
undesired Nash Equilibria which harms the PoA.
This raises the question whether a more sophisticated ap-
proach can do better. We show that indeed this is possible.
In particular, we develop an incentive mechanism with a
linear packet dropping that can improve the system efficiency
to be arbitrarily close to the global optimal point (i.e., a
PoA arbitrarily close to 1). This mechanism is similar to the
Random Early Detection (RED) used for congestion avoidance
on the Internet [16]. We prove the uniqueness of NE of the
2game with this mechanism. We also show that best response
dynamics will converge to the unique NE.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes
the related work. We present the model of an M/M/1 queue
game in Section III. The social welfare and Price of Anarchy
are described in section IV to investigate the efficiency of
the NE. Then, in section V, we propose to design an incentive
packet dropping scheme implemented at the server to improve
the efficiency. Section VI proves that the game defined with
packet dropping policy is an ordinal potential game by giving
the potential function. Section VII shows the best response
function. In section VIII, we show the behavior when utilizing
a simple step-function for packet dropping. In section IX we
propose the RED-like linear packet dropping incentive scheme.
We show that with this scheme, it is possible to make the
Price of Anarchy arbitrarily close to the optimal point. The
uniqueness of NE of such a game is proved in section X.
In section XI, we show that the best response dynamics will
converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium. In section XII, we
undertake simulations to see how the process of statistically
estimating the input arrival rates in a real system would impact
the PoA. We conclude the work in section XIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Throughput-delay tradeoffs in M/M/1 queues with selfish
users have been previously studied in [10]–[14]. A utility func-
tion for each user is defined as the corresponding application’s
power and each user is treated as a player in such a game
and adjusts its arrival rate to handle the trade-off between
throughput and delay. Every user is assumed to be selfish and
only wants to maximize its own utility function in a distributed
manner.
Bharath-Kumar and Jaffe [10] wrote one of the earliest
papers on the formulation of throughput-delay tradeoffs in
M/M/1 queues with selfish users. The paper discusses the
properties of power as a network performance objective func-
tion. A class of greedy algorithms where each user updates its
sending rate synchronously to the best response of all other
users’ rates to maximize the power is proposed. Convergence
of the best response to an equilibrium point is shown in this
paper.
Douligeris and Mazumdar [11] extended Bharath-Kumar
and Jaffe’s work to the case with different weighting fac-
tors defined in the power function for different users and
provided analytical results describing the Nash Equilibrium.
They showed that the equilibrium point that the greedy best
response dynamic algorithm converged to was a unique Nash
Equilibrium.
The work by Zhang and Douligeris [12] proved the con-
vergence of the best response dynamics for this basic M/M/1
queueing game under the multiple users case. Thus all these
prior works ( [10]–[12]) studied only variants of the basic
game. Their work, along with ours, shows that this basic
game results in an inefficient outcome. Our work is the first to
develop a mechanism design for this problem that addresses
this shortcoming by showing how to achieve near-optimal
performance using a packet-dropping policy.
Dutta et al. [13] studied a related problem involving a server
that employs an oblivious active queue management scheme,
i.e. drops packets depending on the total queue occupancy
with the same probability regardless of which flow they
come from. They also consider an M/M/1 setting with users
offering Poisson traffic to a server with exponential service
time. The users’ actions are the input rates and the utilities
the goodput/output rates. The existence and the quality of
symmetric Nash equilibria are studied for different packet
dropping policies. Although our work also explores oblivious
packet dropping schemes, it is different from and somewhat
more challenging to analyze than [13], because our utility
function reflects the tradeoff between goodput and delay.
In another, more recent work, [14], Su and van der Schaar
have discussed linearly coupled communication games in
which users’ utilities are linearly impacted by their competi-
tors’ actions. An M/M/1 FCFS queuing game with the power
as the utility function is one illustrative example of linearly
coupled communication games. They also quantify the Price
of Anarchy in this case, and investigate an alternative solu-
tion concept called Conjectural Equilibrium, which requires
users to maintain and operate upon additional beliefs about
competitors.
There have been also several other papers related to queue-
ing games, albeit with different formulations. Haviv and
Roughgarden [17] considered a system with multiple servers
with heterogeneous service rates. Arrivals from customers are
routed to one of the servers, and the routing decisions are
analyzed based on NE or social optimization schemes. PoA is
shown to be upper bounded by the number of servers for the
social optimum. Wu and Starobinski [18] analyzed the PoA
of N parallel links where the delays of links are characterized
using unbounded delay functions such as M/M/1 or M/G/1
queueing functions. Economides and Silvester [19] studied
a multiserver two-class queueing game and developed the
routing policy.
For more general surveys on game theoretic formulations
of networking problems, we refer the reader to [4], [20].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a M/M/1 FCFS queue game as shown in Fig.
1. There are m users with independent Poisson arrivals and
the arrival rates are λ1, λ2, . . . , λm. There is a single server
and the service time is exponentially distributed with mean 1
µ
.
We consider each user as a player for this game and the
users are selfish. Each player wants to maximize its own utility
function by adjusting its rate sending to the queue.
Note that there is a tradeoff between the throughput and
delay for each user, i.e., given the rates of all other users,
if the input rate increases, the delay increases too. In this
paper, we consider the measurement of this tradeoff between
the throughput and delay of the each user, and it is known as
the “power”, which is widely used in the gateway congestion
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Fig. 1. An M/M/1 queue
control context [9]. We consider the power as the utility
function of each user to measure its throughput-delay tradeoff.
For a given user i, the power is defined as:
Power =
Throughputαi
Delay
, (1)
where αi is a parameter chosen based on the relative emphasis
placed on throughput versus delay. αi > 1 when throughput is
more important, while 0 < αi < 1 when we want to emphasis
delay more, and αi = 1 when the throughput and delay are
emphasized equally.
For M/M/1 queue, the throughput for user i is Ti = λei
where λei is the effective rate served by the server. The delay
for user i is calculated as: Di = 1
µ−
m∑
i=1
λe
i
. So the power for
user i can be expressed as:
Pi =
Tαii
Di
= (λei )
αi(µ−
m∑
i=1
λei ). (2)
In this M/M/1 game, each player is selfish and wants to
adjust its arrival rate λi to maximize its own utility function.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the queue is stable and
thus 0 ≤
m∑
i=1
λei < µ.
When there is no dropping policy implemented at the server,
λei = λi, and the optimization problem for each player i is:
max Ui(λi, λ−i) = λ
αi
i (µ−
m∑
i=1
λi) (3)
s.t.
∑
λi < µ
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE AND PRICE OF ANARCHY
In [11] the above M/M/1 queue game is studied and a unique
pure NE is proved to be:
λNEi =
µαi
m∑
k=1
αk + 1
, ∀ i. (4)
When αi = α, ∀i, this unique NE is expressed as λNEi =
µα
αm+1 , ∀ i. Now suppose all users cooperate to achieve the
maximal system utility. We consider two ways to define the
social optimal function: the sum of the utilities of all the
users and the sum of the logarithm of the utilities of all the
users. Defining the social optimal function as the sum of the
utilities of all the users is a common way for evaluating the
system efficiency and we present the analysis results under this
definition first. However, the fairness among the users should
also be considered and it is not revealed under this definition;
so we also consider a log-sum-utility social welfare function
which provides for utility fairness.
We can measure the efficiency of the system using two well
known measures called the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price
of Stability (PoS), that respectively compare the performance
of selfish users in the worst and best case Nash Equilibrium
with the global optimum achievable with non-selfish users.
The definition of PoA and PoS of a game G is:
PoA(G) , max
a∈E(G)
U(aOPT )
U(a)
. (5)
PoS(G) , min
a∈E(G)
U(aOPT )
U(a)
. (6)
where E is the set of all the Nash Equilibriums in game G.
A. Sum-utility
The optimization problem is defined as:
max
∑
λαi (µ−
∑
λi) (7)
s.t. 0 ≤
∑
λi < µ
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
Here we consider two cases:
1) α > 1
First calculate UOPT .
UOPT = max
λi
∑
λαi (µ−
∑
λi)
≤ max
λi
(
∑
λi)
α(µ−
∑
λi)
= max
λ
λα(µ− λ)
(8)
We can get λ∗ = µα
α+1 .
Equality holds in equation 8 when λi = λ∗ for some i, and
λi = 0, ∀j 6= i. Hence this is also the solution for POPTsys .
UOPT =
ααµα+1
(α+ 1)α+1
.
Then we calculate UNE when players are selfish:
UNE =
mααµα+1
(αm+ 1)α+1
.
Note that there is only one NE in the game, so PoA and
PoS are the same and they are derived as below:
PoA(G) = PoS(G) =
UOPT
UNE
=
(αm+ 1)α+1
m(α+ 1)α+1
. (9)
In this case we find that the PoA and PoS are proportional
to mα.
2) α < 1
The calculation is similar as above, and details are omitted.
UOPT = max
λi
∑
λαi (µ−
∑
λi)
≤ mmax
λi
(
∑
λi
m
)α(µ−
∑
λi)
= max
λ
m1−αλα(µ− λ).
4We also get λ∗ = µα
α+1 ,
UOPT =
m1−αααµα+1
(α + 1)α+1
.
PoA and PoS are:
PoA(G) = PoS(G) =
UOPT
UNE
=
(αm+ 1)α+1
mα(α+ 1)α+1
. (10)
In this case we find that the PoA and PoS are proportional
to m.
Thus in both cases, we find that the PoA and PoS degrade
linearly or worse with the number of users.
B. Sum-log-utility
Now let’s consider the sum of the logarithm of the utilities
of all the users. The reason we consider the logarithm function
in the social welfare is because when all users cooperate to
achieve the optimum, fairness among the users should also be
considered, and a logarithmic function would ensure this. The
social welfare optimization problem is:
max
m∑
i=1
log
[
λαi (µ−
m∑
i=1
λi)
]
(11)
s.t. 0 ≤
m∑
i=1
λi < µ
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
Note that for each player, maximizing the logarithm of its
utility function is equivalent to maximizing the utility function
itself. Therefore the NE remains the same as before.
Denote λ =
m∑
i=1
λi. We have the following theorem for
finding out the social optimum:
Theorem 1: The solution for the social welfare optimiza-
tion problem is: λ∗i =
µα
m(α+1) .
Proof: see Appendix A.
Note that λNEi is shown in (4) and by substituting it into
(3), we get the power for user i as:
UNEi =
ααµα+1
(αm+ 1)α+1
In general, the log-utility terms can be negative. To ensure
that both the numerator and denominator terms in the PoA
and PoS are non-negative in this case, we use a monotonic
exponential mapping. Note that there is only one NE in the
game, so PoA and PoS are the same, and they are derived as
below:
PoA(G) = PoS(G) =
eU
OPT
eU
NE
=
(
ααµα+1
mα(α+1)α+1
)m
(
ααµα+1
(αm+1)α+1
)m
=
(
(αm+ 1)α+1
mα(α+ 1)α+1
)m
> 1.
(12)
From (12) we can see that PoA increases monotonically as
m increases and goes to infinity as m goes to infinity. So we
want to implement an incentive mechanism to improve the
PoA.
V. AN INCENTIVE PACKET DROPPING SCHEME
Note that λNEi =
µα
αm+1 >
µα
m(α+1) = λ
∗
i . This inspires us
to find an incentive packet dropping mechanism implemented
at the server and we wish this packet dropping mechanism to
be as simple as possible. So we consider the case where the
server need only monitor the sum of the rates of all users in
the system and implement the packet dropping policy based
only on this information. Then the packet dropping function
could be expressed as Pd(
∑
λi). So the optimization problem
for each user i with a dropping policy in the system is:
max Ui(λi, λ−i) = (λi(1 − Pd(
∑
λi)))
αi
(µ−
∑
(λi(1− Pd(
∑
λi))))
s.t.
∑
λi(1 − Pd(
∑
λi)) < µ
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
(13)
To facilitate the derivation, denote P (
∑
λi) = 1−Pd(
∑
λi)
and thus P (·) is the probability of keeping packets in the
system. Then the optimization problem for each player i is:
max Ui(λi, λ−i) = (λiP (
∑
λi))
αi
(µ−
∑
(λiP (
∑
λi)))) (14)
s.t.
∑
λiP (
∑
λi) < µ (15)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (16)
We denote the above game as Gp = (N, {Ai}, {Ui}).
VI. POTENTIAL GAME
In this section, we prove that when the dropping function is
a function which only depends on the sum of total incoming
rates, the game is a potential game and thus there exists at
least one pure NE.
Definition 1: a game G = (N, {Ai}, {Ui}) is called an
ordinal potential game if there exists a global function φ :
A −→ R such that for every player i ∈ N , for every
a−i ∈ A−i and for every a′i, a′′i ∈ Ai,
sgn(Ui(a
′
i, a−i)−Ui(a
′′
i , a−i)) = sgn(φ(a
′
i, a−i)−φ(a
′′
i , a−i))
(17)
where sgn(x) is the sign function that takes on the value -1
when x < 0, 0 when x = 0, and 1 when x > 0.
Also, the following Theorem 2 holds for the existence of
NE in a potential game:
Theorem 2: [Monderer-Shapley, 1996 [15]] Every potential
game with finite-players, continuous utilities, and compact
strategy sets possesses at least one pure-strategy equilibrium.
Now we will prove that the M/M/1 queueing game with a
packet dropping function Pd(
∑
λi) is a potential game.
Theorem 3: Gp is a ordinal potential game with potential
function
φ(λ1, λ2, . . . , λm) =
(
µ− P (
∑
λi)
m∑
i=1
λi
)(
m∏
i=1
(λiP (
∑
λi))
αi
)
5Proof:
φ(λ′i, λ−i)− φ(λ
′′
i , λ−i)
=
µ− P (λ′i + λ−i)( m∑
j 6=i
λj + λ
′
i)

 m∏
j 6=i
(λjP (
∑
λj))
αj
λ′αii P (λ′i + λ−i)αi
−
µ− P (λ′′i + λ−i)( m∑
j 6=i
λj + λ
′′
i )

 m∏
j 6=i
(λjP (
∑
λj))
αj
λ′′αii P (λ′′i + λ−i)αi
=
 m∏
j 6=i
(λiP (
∑
λi))
αi
 [(µ− P (λ′i + λ−i)
(
m∑
j 6=i
λj + λ
′
i))(λ
′
iP (λ
′
i + λ−i))
αi
− (µ− P (λ′′i + λ−i)(
m∑
j 6=i
λj + λ
′′
i ))(λ
′′
i P (λ
′′
i + λ−i))
αi ]
=
 m∏
j 6=i
(λiP (
∑
λi))
αi
 (Ui(λ′i, λ−i)− Ui(λ′′i , λ−i))
Note that Gp has a finite number of players and continuous
utilities. However its strategy sets are not compact in (15) so
we could not directly apply Theorem 2 to claim there exists at
least one NE in Gp. But we modify the Gp to be the equivalent
game as follows:
max Ui(λi, λ−i) = (λiP (
∑
λi)))
αi
(µ−
∑
(λiP (
∑
λi))))
s.t.
∑
λiP (
∑
λi) ≤ µ
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
(18)
since any solution to the maximization problem in Gp will
not satisfy
∑
λiP (
∑
λi) = µ. Now strategy sets of Gp are
compact and thus there exists at least one NE in Gp.
Note that in the following when we describe PoA and PoS
for the packet dropping game Gp, we respectively compare the
worst and best NE obtained for this game with respect to the
social welfare (global optimum) that can be obtained through
cooperation without packet dropping.
VII. BEST RESPONSE FUNCTION
From now, for tractability, we consider the case αi = α, ∀i
for our proposed incentive packet dropping scheme.
∀i, let
∂Ui(λi, λ
′
−i)
∂λi
= 0.
If P (
∑
λi) is differentiable with respect to λi, we will have
αPµ− (α+ 1)PP ′λiλ−i − (α+ 1)PP
′λ2i
− αP 2λ−i − (α+ 1)P
2λi + αP
′λiµ = 0
(19)
where P ′ is the derivative of P (
∑
λi) with respect to λi.
The above defines an implicit best response function
F(λi, λ−i) = 0 which shows the relationship between λi and
λ−i.
VIII. STEP DROPPING FUNCTION
An intuitive dropping policy that first comes to mind is a
step function as shown in Fig. 2.
)( idP  
* 
1
Fig. 2. Step dropping function Pd(
∑
λi)
The expression of Pd(
∑
λi) is:
Pd(
∑
λi) =
{
0 :
∑
λi ≤ λ
∗
1 :
∑
λi > λ
∗ (20)
We have the following result for the corresponding packet
dropping game.
Theorem 4: λ′ is a N.E. if and only if
∑
λ′i = λ
∗
.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 4, the NEs of the game with the step
dropping function are not unique. PoS = 1 since there exists a
NE with λi = λ∗i , ∀i. However, in the sum-utility case, PoA =
mα−1 when α > 1, and PoA = m1−α when α < 1. Moreover,
PoA is infinite in the sum-log-utility case since there exists a
NE which has one user i with λi = 0. Hence this is not
a desirable result for improving the efficiency. We therefore
next consider a slightly more sophisticated dropping function
that has a linear profile.
IX. LINEAR DROPPING FUNCTION
)( idP  1r
1
2r )( iP  1r
1
2r
Fig. 3. Illustration of Pd(
∑
λi) and P (
∑
λi)
We consider the game with the following linear function of
P (
∑
λi) (and thus the packet dropping function Pd(
∑
λi) =
1 − P (
∑
λi) is also a linear function.) Fig. 3 illustrates
Pd(
∑
λi) and P (
∑
λi).
P (
∑
λi) =

1 : 0 ≤
∑
λi ≤ r1
A(
∑
λi) +D : r1 ≤
∑
λi ≤ r2
0 :
∑
λi ≥ r2
(21)
6where  A =
1
r1 − r2
D = −Ar2
P ′ =
∂P
∂λi
= A.
For linear dropping scheme, (19) becomes:
αPµ− (α+ 1)PAλiλ−i − (α+ 1)PAλ
2
i
− αP 2λ−i − (α+ 1)P
2λi + αAλiµ = 0
(22)
The above also defines an implicit function F(λi, λ−i) = 0.
Denote λei = P (
∑
λi)λi and λe−i = P (
∑
λi)λ−i. First we
want find out if we could design a dropping policy in this
linear form such that the system could have a NE that is the
same as the social optimum. If not, we will then explore how
much efficiency it could achieve.
Theorem 5: There does not exist a linear packet dropping
policy such that PoA = 1.
Proof:
Assume the above Theorem does not hold, when P 6= 0,
substituting λi and λ−i with λei /P and λe−i/P we have,
αPµ−
1
P
(α+ 1)Aλeiλ
e
−i −
1
P
(α+ 1)A(λei )
2
− αPλe−i − (α+ 1)Pλ
e
i +
1
P
αAλeiµ = 0
=⇒ P (αµ− αλe−i − (α+ 1)λ
e
i )
=
1
P
[(α+ 1)Aλeiλ
e
−i + (α + 1)A(λ
e
i )
2 − αAλeiµ]
Since λ∗ = µα
α+1 implies αµ = (α+ 1)λ
∗
, we have
P [(α+ 1)λ∗ − αλe−i − (α + 1)λ
e
i ]
=
1
P
Aλei [(α + 1)(λ
e
−i + λ
e
i )− (α+ 1)λ
∗]
=⇒ P [(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
−i]
=
1
P
Aλei (α+ 1)(λ
e
−i + λ
e
i − λ
∗)
(23)
Note that Pλi + Pλ−i = λ∗ implies that λei + λe−i = λ∗.
So the right-hand side of the equality is 0. While the left-hand
side of the equality is Pλe−i. Since λe−i 6= 0, so Pλe−i 6= 0.
Thus the left-hand side of the equality is not 0 and this leads
to a contradiction. Therefore Theorem 5 holds.
Theorem 5 shows that we could not design a linear packet
dropping policy with PoA = 1. The following theorem shows
that we could design an incentive packet dropping policy such
that PoA could be arbitrarily close to 1.
Theorem 6: Given any ǫ, there exists a linear packet drop-
ping policy such that 1 < PoA ≤ 1 + ǫ.
Proof:
Note (23) in the proof of Theorem 5 implies:
P 2[(α+1)(λ∗−λe−i−λ
e
i )+λ
e
−i] = Aλ
e
i (α+1)(λ
e
−i+λ
e
i−λ
∗)
(24)
The right-hand side of (24) is greater than 0 only when
λe−i + λ
e
i < λ
∗ (note that A < 0). Then given A and λei , λe−i
such that λe−i + λei < λ∗, we will have a solution for P 2 and
thus we could get the value of D.
This means that we can design a packet dropping scheme
such that it has a NE that satisfies pλi + pλ−i −→ λ∗ from
the left side (left approximation). If we can further prove that
the NE is unique in this game (see Theorem 8), then give any
ǫ > 0, we could find a linear packet dropping policy at the
server such that 1 < PoA ≤ 1 + ǫ.
We propose Algorithm 1 to show how to design the pa-
rameters r1 and r2 in our proposed incentive packet dropping
policy to achieve a desired PoA such that 1 < PoA ≤ 1 + ǫ
given any ǫ. We denote λe =
∑
λei . Line 1 ensures that
the sum of the rates will be less than µ before the server
starts to drop packets. p˜ is the value of P (
∑
λ) at the
desired NE which is derived from the desired PoA. p˜ =
1− Pr{the packet dropping probability at desired NE}. Line
2 is the calculation of desired NE. The choice of λ˜ is based
on the desired value of PoA, i.e., given ǫ > 0, we could
accordingly derive the value of a desired sum rate such that
1 < PoA ≤ 1 + ǫ. Since (λ˜e, p˜) is a solution of P (
∑
λ),
line 3 shows how to therefore get the expression of A and D.
Then at line 4, we could solve the equation (22) given all the
values above and get the value of r2. Based on the result of
r2, the value of r1 is calculated.
Algorithm 1 Parameter Calculation for Incentive Packet Drop-
ping Scheme
Input: PoA bound parameter ǫ
Output: r1 and r2 of our proposed incentive packet dropping
policy in (21) such that 1 < PoA ≤ 1 + ǫ.
1: Pick any p˜ such that a
a+1 < p˜ < 1.
2: Calculate a desired sum rate λ˜, of which
λ˜ = {
λ˜e
mp˜
,
(m− 1)λ˜e
mp˜
}. (25)
is the desired NE such that 1 < PoA ≤ 1 + ǫ. Note that
λe = p˜λ.
3: Suppose P (
∑
λi) = A
∑
λi+D pass through the point
(λ˜, p˜). Then we have
A =
p˜
λ˜− r2
, D = −
p˜r2
λ˜− r2
. (26)
4: Insert the above values of the variables into (22) and get
the value of r2.
5: Insert the value of r2 into (26) and get the value of A.
Then r1 = 1A + r2
Note that (22) is a quadratic equation for the parameters A
and D given the values of all the other variables. But with
Algorithm 1, we could always find a unique solution as stated
in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7: Algorithm 1 yields a unique linear packet
dropping scheme, i.e., unique values for r1 and r2 for any
PoA bound.
7Proof:
After inserting the value p˜, and λ˜ = { λ˜e
mp˜
, (m−1)λ˜e
mp˜
} into
(22) at line 4, we have the equality
p˜2[(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λ˜e) +
(m− 1)λ˜e
mp˜
]
=
p˜
λ˜e/p˜− r2
λ˜e
mp˜
(α + 1)(λ˜e − λ
∗)
(27)
It is obvious that the above is a linear equation of the
variable r2. And thus we could get a unique solution of r2.
Therefore, there is a always a unique solution of r1 and r2
provided by Algorithm 1.
Our proposed packet dropping scheme is similar to the
Random Early Detection (RED) algorithm. It is simple and
easy to be implemented with low overhead at the server. Fig.
4 shows an example of our linear packet dropping policy with
µ = 6, m = 2 and α = 2. (11) and (12) are used to calculate
the utility and PoA. Point A represents λ∗, which is then
calculated to be 4 (λ1 = λ2 = 2). We assume p˜ = 0.9,
PoA bound parameter ǫ = 0.05. Implementing Algorithm 1
with Matlab, we pick λ˜e = 3.9, we then get r1 = 4.3012,
r2 = 4.622, A = −3.1154, D = 14.4000. Point B represents
the Nash Equilibrium with our proposed packets dropping
policy. Point C represents the Nash Equilibrium of the original
game without packet dropping policy. The shaded area shows
the cases where packet dropping happens. For the comparison,
the utilities are shown in the figure and we can see that PoA
is improved from 1.3396 to 1.0455.
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Fig. 4. An example of our incentive packet dropping scheme.
X. UNIQUENESS OF NE
If we use the packet dropping scheme in algorithm 1 we
are guaranteed that the game Gp always has a NE with the
desired PoA bound. Now our question is whether the scheme
yields a unique NE. This is important not only for finding
out whether our proposed scheme is efficient but also for the
convergence issues. As surveyed in [21], there are not many
general results on equilibrium uniqueness. We were unable
to find any existing theorem that we could use directly to
prove the uniqueness of NE in our M/M/1 queueing game.
This makes the analysis of this incentive design problem more
challenging.
Theorem 8: There is a unique NE for the M/M/1 Game
with the linear packet dropping scheme described in Algo-
rithm 1.
To prove 8, we first prove the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1: |A| increases monotonically as (λ∗ − λ˜e) de-
creases where λ˜e is the total rate of all users at desired NE
(as in Algorithm 1).
Proof: Note that (27) is equivalent to:
p˜2[(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λ˜e) +
(m− 1)λ˜e
mp˜
] = A
λ˜e
mp˜
(α+ 1)(λ˜e − λ
∗)
This means
(m− 1)λ˜e
mp˜(λ∗ − λ˜e)
= (α+ 1)
(
|A|
λ˜e
mp˜
− p˜2
)
. (28)
Note that as (λ∗ − λ˜e) decreases, λ˜e increases and 1
λ∗−λ˜e
increases, so the left-hand side of (28) increase. This implies
|A| increases, and thus Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: ∀λ−i < r1, ∂Ui(λi,λ−i)∂λi > 0 at λi = (r1 −
λ−i)
+
.
Proof:
Note that P = 1 at r1, then
∂Ui(λi, λ−i)
∂λi
= αµ− (α + 1)Aλiλ−i − (α+ 1)Aλ
2
i − αλ−i
− (α+ 1)λi + αAλiµ
= αµ− αλ−i − (α+ 1)λi
−Aλi[(α + 1)(λ−i + λi)− αµ]
= αµ− (α + 1)(λ−i + λi) + λ−i
−Aλi[(α + 1)(λ−i + λi)− αµ]
= [αµ− (α + 1)(λ−i + λi)](1 +Aλi) + λ−i
= [αµ− (α + 1)r1](1 +Aλi) + λ−i
= [(α + 1)λ∗ − (α+ 1)r1](1 +Aλi) + λ−i
= (α + 1)(λ∗ − r1)(1 +A(r1 − λ−i)) + λ−i
Denote (29) as g(λ−i). Then,
∂g
∂λ−i
= −(α+ 1)(λ∗ − r1)A+ 1. (29)
When |A| is large enough such that r1 > λ∗ and |A| >
1
(α+1)(r1−λ∗)
,
∂g
∂λ−i
< 0.
From Lemma 1 we know that as λ˜e gets closer to λ∗, |A|
increases. This means that when we design a dropping policy
with PoA approaching to 1, |A| could be large enough such
that r1 > λ∗ and |A| > 1(α+1)(r1−λ∗) .
So g(λi) achieves the minimum value when λ−i = r1. Then
∂Ui(λi, λ−i)
∂λi
> (α+ 1)(λ∗ − r1) + r1
= (α+ 1)λ∗ − αr1
= αµ− αr1 > 0.
(30)
8Lemma 2 implies that given λ−i, Ui(λi, λ−i) which is a
function of λi, has a maxima at r1−λ−i < λi < r2−λ−i as
shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of local maximum point of Ui(λi, λ−i)
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Fig. 6. Illustration of local maximum point of U1i,max and U2i,max
Given λ−i, if λ−i + (µ−λ−i)αα+1 < r1, then Ui(λi, λ−i) will
reach a local maximal point when λi = (µ−λ−i)αα+1 as shown in
Fig. 6. Note that P (
∑
λi) = 1 at this point. We denote this
local maximal value as U1i,max. Then Ui(λi, λ−i) will reach
another local maximal point with λei =
(µ−λ−i)α
α+1 . Note that
P (
∑
λi) < 1. We denote this local maximal value as U2i,max.
Lemma 3: Given λ−i, if λ−i + (µ−λ−i)αα+1 < r1, U
1
i,max <
U2i,max.
Proof:
Note that
U1i,max = (λ
1
i )
α(µ− (λ1i )− λ−i),
where λ1i =
(µ−λ−i)α
α+1 .
U2i,max = (Pλ
2
i )
α(µ− (Pλ1i )− Pλ−i).
Denote λei = Pλ2i . Note that λei ranges from r1 to 0 and we
have r1 > λ1i . Also note that
max
λe
i
(λei )
α(µ− λei − Pλ−i) > max
λe
i
(λei )
α(µ− λei − λ−i)
since Pλ−i < λ−i. Thus, U2i,max > U1i,max.
We show in Lemma 3 that given λ−i, Ui(λi, λ−i) achieves
the maximal point when P < 1 under the condition that λ−i+
(µ−λ−i)α
α+1 ≤ r1. When λ−i+
(µ−λ−i)α
α+1 > r1, there is only one
maximal point for Ui(λi, λ−i). When λ−i + (µ−λ−i)αα+1 = r1,
U1i,max and U2i,max will overlap, and since r1 > λ∗, this case
could not result in a NE and thus we do not consider this case.
Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 shows that given λ−i,
Ui(λi, λ−i) achieves the maximal point when P < 1. Then
we will prove the uniqueness of NE based on the expression
P (
∑
λi) = A(λi + λ−i) +D.
Proof of Theorem 8:
Suppose the Gp has more than one NE. Note that the
game is symmetric, so there must exist one NE λ =
{λ1, λ2, . . . , λm}, such that ∃ i, j, λi 6= λj . This means
there exists a NE λ = {λi, λ−i} and a constant c such that
λ = {λi + c, λ−i − c} is also a NE.
We insert λ = {λi, λ−i} into (24) and we get:
[A(λi + λ−i) +D]
2[(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
−i]
= Aλei (α + 1)(λ
e
−i + λ
e
i − λ
∗)
=⇒
(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
−i
λei
=
1
[A(λi + λ−i) +D]2
A(α+ 1)(λe−i + λ
e
i − λ
∗)
(31)
We also insert λ = {λi + c, λ−i − c} into (24) and denote
c˜ = c
A(λi+c˜+λ−i−c˜)+D
= c
A(λi+λ−i)+D
. We have:
[A(λi + c˜+ λ−i − c˜) +D]
2
[(α + 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − c˜− λ
e
i + c˜) + λ
e
−i − c˜]
= A(λei + c˜)(α + 1)(λ
e
−i − c˜+ λ
e
i + c˜− λ
∗)
=⇒
(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
−i − c˜
λei + c˜
=
1
[A(λi + λ−i) +D]2
A(α+ 1)(λe−i + λ
e
i − λ
∗)
(32)
Note that the right-hand side of (31) and (32) are the same
and thus the left-hand side of (31) and (32) are equal to each
other. So,
(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
−i
λei
=
(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
−i − c˜
λei + c˜
=⇒ (λei + c˜)(α+ 1)(λ
∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + (λ
e
i + c˜)λ
e
−i
= λei (α+ 1)(λ
∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + λ
e
i (λ
e
−i − c˜)
=⇒ c˜(α+ 1)(λ∗ − λe−i − λ
e
i ) + c˜(λ
e
−i + λ
e
i ) = 0
=⇒ c˜[(α+ 1)λ∗ − α(λe−i + λ
e
i )] = 0
=⇒ c˜[αµ− α(λe−i + λ
e
i )] = 0
=⇒ c˜α[µ− (λe−i + λ
e
i )] = 0
=⇒
cα[µ− (λe−i + λ
e
i )]
A(λi + λ−i) +D
= 0.
9Note that µ − (λe−i + λei ) > 0. This implies that c = 0 and
therefore Theorem 8 holds.
XI. BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS AND CONVERGENCE
In this section, we show that the best response dynamic [7],
a simple learning mechanism, will lead the queuing game to
converge to the pure Nash equilibrium.
Best response dynamic is a straightforward updating rule
which proceeds as follows: whenever player i has an oppor-
tunity to revise her strategy, she will choose the best response
to the actions of all the other players in the previous round.
Mathematically, for a game G = (N, {Ai}, {Ui}), let ati
denotes the action of player i in iteration t,
ati = arg max
a′
i
∈Ai
Ui(a
′
i, a
t−1
−i ). (33)
In general, the best response dynamic is not guaranteed
to converge. However, if the process does converge, it is
guaranteed to converge to a NE. Now, we want to investigate
the convergence of our proposed M/M/1 Game with the packet
dropping scheme, denoted as Gp in the previous section.
Theorem 9: Best response dynamic will converge to the
unique NE for the M/M/1 Game with the proposed packet
dropping scheme.
Proof:
There is an important result about the convergence for
ordinal potential game as shown in Theorem 21 in [7]: if G is
an ordinal potential game with a compact action space and a
continuous potential function, then the best response dynamic
will (almost surely) either converge to a NE or every limit
point of the sequence will be a NE.
We have showed in Theorem 3 that Gp is an ordinal
potential game, and although the original definition of the
game does not have a compact action space, the equivalent
modification as shown in (18) has a compact action space.
We can also see that the potential function is continuous. We
have also proved in Theorem 8 that there is a unique NE. Thus
Theorem 9 holds.
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Fig. 7. Quiver plot for a two user example with µ = 10, α = 2, r1 = 7.0321
and r2 = 7.8222. The vector length are scaled to 1
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Figure 7 is an illustration of Theorem 9 by the quiver plot.
In Figure 7, on the lower triangle of a grid (i.e., the feasible
operating domain), we plot vector summation for a two-user
rate control queuing game with µ = 10, α = 2, r1 = 7.0321
and r2 = 7.8222. At each point, the vectors’ projections on
λ1 and λ2 represent the best response for the corresponding
users in next iteration. To make the plot neat, the length of
each vector is scaled to 114 of the original length. The figure
shows that at each point, the players in the best response
dynamic move towards the equilibrium point. The length of
the best response vectors are proportional to the distance from
the equilibrium point. At the equilibrium point, the step size
of the movement in the next iteration tends to zero, which
implies the convergence of the best response dynamic.
XII. IMPACT OF ARRIVAL RATE ESTIMATION
For a real system implementation, the server needs to
estimate the total arrival rate from users in order to apply
the incentive packet dropping scheme. The packets arrive
randomly over time, so there will be a difference between the
estimated total rate and the average total rate. This inaccuracy
will cause a loss in the PoA. While applying the packets
dropping scheme, we note that the closer to 1 the desired
PoA is, the steeper (on the linear part) the packet dropping
scheme is, and therefore, the greater the impact of estimation
inaccuracy will be. So as the desired PoA approaches 1, on the
one hand the PoA of the real system should increase due to
the implementation of the incentive scheme, but on the other
hand, the sensitivity to estimation error will reduce the gain
in PoA. Therefore, the achieved PoA in practice may not be
arbitrarily close to 1.
We show this fact in Figure 8 to 11 where we show
simulation results from a 3-user queue with α = 2. In these
simulations, we discretize time into slots. The server estimates
the mean arrival rate from the previous time slot and applies
the packet dropping function corresponding to a desired PoA
to all packets in the current slot (the users contribute arrivals
at a constant rate that corresponds to the equilibrium input for
this desired PoA). The running time for all the simulations
is 105 time slots. Figure 8 and 9 show the simulation results
of PoA under different service rates for both the sum-utility
definition and sum-log-utility definition with the instantaneous
arrival rate to the server as the estimated arrival rate. We can
see that as the service rate varies from 500 to 5000 packets per
time slot, the optimal point of PoA (i.e. the lowest achievable
PoA) is getting closer to 1 because the estimation inaccuracy
decreases. Also, the empirically achieved PoA is getting closer
to the desired PoA.
Note that when the service rate is low, the achievable PoA
we get could be very bad as shown in figure 8(a) and 9(a). In
these cases, using more history data/longer estimation lengths
will help to increase the estimation accuracy and improve PoA.
The comparison results under different estimation lengths for
µ = 600 packets per time slot are shown in figure 10 and
11. These simulation results illustrate a tradeoff between the
optimal PoA and the overhead in computing and storage: while
estimating with more history data will increase the estimation
10
accuracy and therefore increase PoA, it increases the overhead
in terms of computing and storage.
XIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a novel incentive mechanism
for M/M/1 queueing games with throughput-delay tradeoffs.
Because the original game yields an inefficient Nash equi-
librium, we propose to implement a linear packet dropping
mechanism at the router. We show how the parameters of this
mechanism can be optimized to ensure system efficiency that
is arbitrarily close to the social welfare solution. Further, we
prove that the proposed modification has a unique NE, and that
the simple best response dynamics converges to this solution.
Future work could consider extensions of this work to consider
non-homogeneous users, other queuing models beyond the
M/M/1 model, more complex arrangements of multiple routers
in a network, as well as other system issues that may arise in
practical implementations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank Professor Rahul Jain at University
of Southern California for his valuable comments.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof:
m∑
i=1
log
[
λαi (µ−
m∑
i=1
λi)
]
= α log(
∏
λi) +m log(µ− λ)
≤ α log(
∑
λi
m
)m +m log(µ− λ) (34)
= m log(
λ
m
)α(µ− λ))
Denote f(λ) = λα(µ− λ). So maximize (11) is equivalent
to maximize f(λ). Take the derivative of f(λ) and let it equals
0. We get:
∂f
∂λ
= 0⇒ λ∗ =
µα
α+ 1
.
Note that equality holds in (34) only when λ1 = λ2 = · · · =
λm. This implies λ∗i = λ
∗
m
= µα
m(α+1)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: (⇐=)
Suppose
∑
λ′i = λ
∗
. ∀i, let ∂U(λi,λ
′
−i)
∂λi
= 0. We get the
optimal point λ∗∗i =
(µ−
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j)αi
αi+1
.
Note that
λ′i = λ
∗ −
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j =
αµ
α+1 −
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j
=
(µ−
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j)αi−
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j
αi+1
<
(µ−
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j)αi
αi+1
= λ∗∗i .
Also, ∀λi < λ∗∗i ,
∂U(λi,λ
′
−i)
∂λi
> 0, which means U(λi, λ′−i)
increases monotonically with respect to 0 ≤ λi < λ∗∗i ,
so U(λ′i, λ
′
−i) > U(λi, λ
′
−i), ∀λi ∈ [0, λ
′
i). Also note that
U(λi, λ
′
−i) = 0, ∀λi ∈ (λ
∗
i , µ −
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j). Hence λ′i ∈
Bi(λ
′
−i).
Therefore, λ′ is a N.E.
(=⇒)
Suppose λ′ is a N.E., ∀i, λ′i ∈ Bi(λ′−i).
∀λ′−i, consider the following two cases:
1) ∑j 6=i λ′j ≤ λ∗:
Denote λ′′i = λ∗ −
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j . Then < λ′′i , λ′−i > is a N.E.,
λ′′i ∈ Bi(λ
′
−i). U(λ
′′
i , λ
′
−i) = U(λ
′
i, λ
′
−i) > 0. So λ′i ≤ λ∗ −∑
j 6=i λ
′
j = λ
′′ (if not so, U(λ′i, λ′−i) = 0).
Note that U(λi, λ′−i) increases monotonically with respect
to 0 ≤ λi < λ′′i . Therefore, λ′ = λ′′.
∑
λ′i = λ
∗
.
2) ∑j 6=i λ′j > λ∗:
Under this case, since
∑
λ′ > λ∗, we have Bi(λ′−i) = 0, ∀i.
Then
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j ≥ λ
∗ holds for all i.
∀i, λ′i < µ−
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j < µ− λ
∗ = µ− µα
α+1 =
µ
α+1 . So
m∑
i=1
λ′i <
µm
α+ 1
< µ⇒ m < α+ 1. (35)
However, note that
λ∗ =
µα
α+ 1
<
∑
j 6=i
λ′j <
µ(m− 1)
α+ 1
⇒ m > α+ 1 (36)
Since (35) and (36) contradict each other, there is no N.E.
λ′ such that
∑
j 6=i λ
′
j > λ
∗
.
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(a) µ = 500.
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(b) µ = 5000.
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(c) µ = 50000.
Fig. 8. Simulation results of PoA under different service rates of a 3-user system with α = 2 (sum-utility definition).
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(a) µ = 500.
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(b) µ = 5000.
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(c) µ = 50000.
Fig. 9. Simulation results of PoA under different service rates of a 3-user system with α = 2 (sum-log-utility definition).
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(a) The estimated total rate got based on the instan-
taneous arrival rate.
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(b) The estimated total rate got by averaging the
continuous arrival rates in 10 slots.
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(c) The estimated total rate got by averaging the
continuous arrival rates in 100 slots.
Fig. 10. Impact of estimation length on PoA of a 3-user system with µ = 600, α = 2 (sum-utility definition).
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(a) The estimated total rate got based on the instan-
taneous arrival rate.
1 1.001 1.002 1.003 1.004 1.005 1.006 1.007 1.008
1
1.001
1.002
1.003
1.004
1.005
1.006
1.007
1.008
1.009
1.01
Desired PoA
Po
A 
G
ot
 fr
om
 S
im
ul
at
io
n
(b) The estimated total rate got by averaging the
continuous arrival rates in 10 slots.
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(c) The estimated total rate got by averaging the
continuous arrival rates in 100 slots.
Fig. 11. Impact of estimation length on PoA of a 3-user system with µ = 600, α = 2 (sum-log-utility definition).
